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LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


OF" 


C/^ss 


?.J L/VV4*&r.*!*U 


ZTbe  mniversfts  of  Cbicago 

FOUNDED  BY  JOHN  D.  ROCKEFELLER 


The 

Grounds  of  Non-Catholic   Freedom 

in  the  Summa  Theologiae 

of  Thomas  Aquinas 


A  DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED    TO    THE    FACULTY    OF    THE    GRADUATE    DIVINITY 

SCHOOL    IN    CANDIDACY    FOR   THE    DEGREE    OF 

DOCTOR    OF    PHILOSOPHY 


(DEPARTMENT  OF  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY) 


BY  ARTHUR  MAXSON  SMITH 


CHICAGO 

R.  DONNELLEY  &  SONS  COMPANY 
1905 


CONTENTS. 

INTRODUCTION. 

PAGE 

THE  MODERN  INDIVIDUAL 5-7 

CHAPTER  I. 

Two  TYPES  OF  THOUGHT  IN  WESTERN  MEDLEVAL  LIFE. 

Naive  consciousness  of  Germanic  people;  concepts  of 
Graeco-Roman  Philosophy  contained  in  the  Catholic 
Church 8-10 

CHAPTER  II. 

THOMAS'   FUNDAMENTAL   DISTINCTION   BETWEEN   FAITH   AND 
REASON. 

Function,  method,  subject-matter  of  Faith  and  Reason; 
Definition  of  Truth  and  relation  of  Revelation  and 
Reason,  Philosophy  and  Theology  involved  .  .  .  11-14 

CHAPTER  III. 

THE  THOMISTIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  FAITH  AND  REASON  IN  RELA- 
TION TO  MODERN  INDIVIDUALISM. 

Psychology  legitimized;  principle  of  internality;  Will  and 
Faith;  moment  of  progress;  freeing  of  Faith;  freeing 
of  Reason,  as  scientific  research;  inductive  method; 
implicit  negation  of  dualism  between  Nature  and 
Supernatural,  by.  spiritualization  of  the  World  .  .  15-24 

CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  THOMISTIC  DOGMA  "CHURCH." 

Statement  and  justification  of  the  problem;  principles  of 
Unity,  Catholicity,  Sanctity,  Apostolicity,  Infalli- 
bility    25-30 


144076 


4  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  LOGIC  OF  CATHOLICISM  AND  PROTESTANTISM.  PAGE 

Nature  of  the  Reformation.  One  Catholic  Dogma, 
"  Church ";  its  logical  content.  The  character  of  the 
German  mediaeval  school  discipline, — development  of 
logical  critique.  The  problem  of  the  Reformation 
primarily  a  logical  problem.  The  logical  content  of 
the  principles  of  the  Reformation 31-36 


INTRODUCTION. 
THE  MODERN  INDIVIDUAL. 

The  extreme  philosophical  expression  of  modern  individualism  is 
given  in  complete  form  in  the  Hegelian  idea  of  free  logical  activity 
containing  a  moment  of  progress.  Prior  to  Kant,  consciousness  was 
viewed  as  generically  disparate  from  ultimate  reality.  The  real  was 
the  objective.  Consciousness  was  simply  the  sum  of  psychic  experi- 
ences involved  in  the  life  process,  and  had  no  generic  connection 
whatever  with  that  which  was  conceived  as  ultimately  real.  The 
problem  for  philosophy  as  well  as  for  religion,  in  ancient  and  mediaeval 
times,  was:  How  can  the  individual,  conceived  from  this  point  of 
view,  overcome  the  fixed,  generic  dualism  between  consciousness  as 
such,  and  the  world  of  ultimate  truth  and  reality? 

The  Kantian  philosophy  reflected  the  forward,  scientific  impulse 
of  the  enlightenment  period,  by  establishing  the  possibility  and 
validity  of  science  as  grounded  in  the  nature  of  consciousness.  Con- 
sciousness is  no  longer  simply  the  sum  of  perceptions  and  conceptions. 
It  is  conceived  by  Kant  as  composed  of  fixed  categories  which  make 
scientific  procedure  possible  and  valid.  That  is,  science  is,  per  se,  a 
certain  mode  of  conscious  activity,  the  mode  itself  being  fixed  in  the 
nature  of  consciousness.  Kant  thus  made  man  the  lawgiver  within 
the  phenomenal,  physical  world.'  But  for  him  ultimate  reality  still 
rested  in  a  Deity  whose  mind  is  constructive. 

Fichte  introduced  a  yet  larger  conception  of  consciousness  by 
making  it  include  not  only  experience  and  science,  but  the  world  of 
ultimate  moral  values  as  well.  He  conceived  consciousness  not  only 
as  law-giving  for  the  objective  world,  but  also  as  morally  constructive, 
identified  with  the  constructive  mind  of  the  Deity,  and  expressing 
itself  by  this  moral  activity  in  the  objective  world.  Fichte's  concep- 
tion of  the  individual  thus  raises  him  to  unity  with  the  Deity,  a  phase 
of  the  single  consciousness,  actually  creating  the  objective  world. 
Reality  is  thus,  no  longer,  as  in  part  with  Kant,  beyond  and  outside 
of  human  consciousness,  but  consists  in  the  constructive  activity  of 
self-expression. 

Schelling  added  still  another  moment  to  this  conception  of  the 

5 


6    THE  GROUNDS  OF  NON-CATHOLIC  FREEDOM 

individual  by  emphasizing  the  relation  of  consciousness  to  the  results 
of  past  activities.  That  is,  reality  is  stated  not  merely  in  terms  of 
activity  at  any  given  moment  (Fichte),  but  in  terms  of  this  on  the 
basis  of  former  constructive  activity. 

Now  Hegel  combines  all  of  these  elements  in  Kant,  Fichte,  and 
Schelling,  and  brings  to  final  expression  the  element  of  progress 
implied  in  Schelling's  system.  For  Hegel,  consciousness  and  ultimate 
reality  are  identical.  The  individual  is  thus  free  and  is  lawgiver 
within  his  own  world  of  reality  (Kant).  Consciousness  is  again  essen- 
tially active,  creative  (Fichte),  and  yet  again  is  active  process  (Schel- 
ling). Hegel  thus  conceives  of  consciousness  as  developing  in  logical 
order,  overcoming  opposition  to  self,  or  recognition  of  objectivity 
by  reducing  the  opposition  to  terms  of  relation  in  a  yet  larger  self, 
each  occurrence  of  thus  overcoming  the  antithesis  between  self  and 
not-self  constituting  a  new  point  of  vantage  whereby  the  self  passes 
on  to  a  still  higher  stage  of  development.  Hegel  brought  all  reality, 
historical  as  well  as  immediate,  within  the  sphere  of  the  logical  devel- 
opment of  consciousness.  He  completed  the  transfer  from  objective 
substance  to  subject,  gave  final  expression  to  the  freedom  of  the 
individual,  and  made  the  moment  of  progress  central  in  the  definition 
of  consciousness. 

The  philosophical  tendency  in  the  present  century  has  been  to 
temper  the  one-sided,  extreme  Hegelian  idealism  by  an  increasing 
adherence  to  the  results  of  psychological  science,  with  a  consequent 
emphasis  on  the  immediate  content  and  function  of  consciousness, 
and  with  a  corresponding  relaxation  of  the  effort  to  define  conscious- 
ness in  terms  of  ultimate  reality.  On  the  one  hand  this  tendency 
has  resulted  in  a  more  modest  conception  of  the  individual  as  related 
to  the  Absolute,  while  on  the  other  it  has  increased  in  large  degree 
the  conception  of  the  relationship  of  the  individual  to  a  larger  organ- 
ism, society.  Aside  from  the  purely  psychological  inquiry  as  to  the 
function  and  content  of  consciousness  as  such,  philosophy  has  con- 
tented itself  with  stating  the  functions  of  the  individual,  his  capacity, 
norm  of  conduct,  laws  of  development,  as  a  member  of  the  social 
whole.  But  the  conception  of  freedom,  of  activity,  progress,  devel- 
opment, worked  out  by  the  Kantian  and  post-Kantian  systems  is 
taken  for  granted  as  fundamental  in  the  present-day  conception  of 
the  individual. 

Stated  from  the  religious  standpoint,  however,  the  modern  indi- 
vidual is  defined  in  quite  different  terms,  or  rather  with  added  terms. 


THE  GKOUNDS  OF  NON-CATHOLIC  FEEEDOM    7 

Theological  science  readily  grants  the  assumption  of  philosophical 
psychology,  that  consciousness  is  dynamic,  that  the  individual  is 
functionally  related  to  the  social  whole;  but  as  philosophy  takes  for 
its  point  of  departure  psycho-logical  process,  so  theology  takes  for 
its  point  of  departure  the  psycho-religious  activity  of  consciousness, 
and  defines  the  individual  accordingly.  On  one  hand,  this  results 
immediately  in  a  richer  conception  of  the  Absolute,  for  the  Absolute 
of  theology  is  not  only  such  as  is  demanded  by  the  logical  point  of 
view  of  philosophy,  but  is  also  such  as  is  demanded  by  the  point  of 
view  of  religious  life,  which  includes  the  rich  content  of  an  imaginary 
world  of  perfect  being,  of  emotional  fellowship  with  kindred  spirits, 
and  of  communion  with  the  Absolute  Father. 

The  individual  of  philosophy  is  free,  active,  in  organic  relation- 
ship to  a  world  of  beings  like  himself,  yet  each  different  in  capacity 
and  direction  of  development.  The  individual  of  theology  is  free, 
active,  but  also  blessed  in  the  realization  of  an  immediate  relationship 
to  the  Father  of  life;  inspired  by  the  sense  of  a  vocation  in  the  world 
subject  to  the  call  and  direction  of  the  Father;  abounding  in  enthu- 
siasm and  hope  and  endeavor  in  the  sense  of  freedom  to  be  the  child 
and  do  the  will  of  God  unchecked  and  uncompelled  by  any  external 
authority;  humbled  and  exalted  by  the  sense  of  a  capacity  for  infinite 
development;  trusting  in  a  Father's  love  freely  and  naturally 
bestowed,  not  judicially  forced,  upon  spirits  essentially  akin  to  the 
Father  Spirit. 

How  large  a  place  in  modern  history  this  religious  individual  has 
filled  may  be  noted  by  the  mere  reference  to  the  great  movements  of 
modern  times  which,  traced  back  through  every  branch  of  political, 
social,  and  religious  life,  find  their  origin  largely  in  the  religious  prin- 
ciple announced  by  Martin  Luther. 

Stated  in  terms  of  philosophy  and  theology, —  and  the  point  of 
view  of  one  is  precisely  as  valid  as  that  of  the  other, —  the  modern 
individual  is  characterized  by  intellectual,  moral,  and  religious  free- 
dom, by  dynamic  originality,  by  progressive  activity,  by  constant 
functioning  of  his  own  activity  with  respect  to  the  social  whole,  and 
by  immediate  relationship  to  God. 

It  is  the  task  of  this  paper  to  show  the  relation  of  the  work  of 
Thomas  Aquinas  to  the  origin  and  development  of  this  individual. 


I. 

TWO  TYPES  OF  THOUGHT  IN  WESTERN  MEDIAEVAL  LIFE. 

The  entire  significance  of  Thomas  Aquinas  in  relation  to  the 
origin  of  the  modern  spirit  is  due  to  the  fact  of  a  unique  intellectual 
situation  in  Europe  at  the  time  his  Summa  Theologies  was  given  to 
the  world.  There  were,  side  by  side,  two  distinct  types  of  thought, 
neither  of  which  by  itself  could  have  resulted  in  the  modern  concep- 
tion of  the  individual.  But  finally  brought  into  clear  realization  of 
each  other,  largely  by  the  finished  system  of  Thomas,  these  two  types 
of  thought  yield  a  third, — the  beginning  of  modern  individualism. 

The  na'ive,  barbaric  consciousness  of  Germanic  Europe  required 
centuries  of  sharp  conflict  before  it  could  appropriate  and  utilize 
the  civilization  of  classical  Greece  and  Rome.  During  the  first  eight 
centuries  of  the  mediaeval  period  the  general  type  of  life  and  thought 
upon  which  the  church  was  endeavoring  to  build  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire  is  characterized  by  an  almost  imperceptible  development  out 
of  semi-barbarism  in  the  direction  of  that  culture  which  the  Renais- 
sance of  the  fifteenth  century  finally  brought  in.  The  average  man 
of  the  first  part  of  the  mediaeval  period  was  conscious  of  little  else 
beyond  his  own  immediate  physical  surroundings  and  his  immediate 
necessities.  He  was  an  obedient,  unquestioning  child  and  servant 
of  an  institution  which  controlled  his  political  life,  manipulated  his 
moral  conduct,  demanded  his  complete  obedience  and  assent  to  its 
authority,  and  in  return  for  this  acquiescence  calmed  his  barbaric 
fear  of  death  and  the  world  of  darkness,  vouchsafed  to  him  life,  peace, 
blessedness  in  a  new  world  beyond  the  grave.  One  of  the  prime 
elements  in  this  barbaric  consciousness  was  sensibility  of  a  portentous 
institution  which  refused  to  be  questioned,  criticised,  or  understood, 
but  must  be  obeyed.  The  sense  of  absolute  dependence  upon  the 
church  was  inculcated  not  only  by  dire  punishment  of  disobedience, 
but  by  assurance  of  still  more  dreadful  retribution  in  the  life  to  come. 
The  mediaeval  individual  thus  naively  accepted  the  situation  brought 
to  him  by  the  empire  of  the  church,  and  dared  not,  cared  not,  to 
question  the  validity  of  the  regime. 

In  diametrical  contrast  and  opposition  to  this  barbaric  conscious- 

8 


THE   GROUNDS   OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM        9 

ness  was  the  type  of  thought  which  was  bearer  of  the  concepts  of 
ancient  philosophy  fostered  by  the  church  and  involved  in  its  dog- 
matic system.  The  theology  of  the  church  was  in  a  state  of  gradual 
precipitation,  a  process  whereby  traditional  dogmas  were  slowly  but 
surely  assuming  the  character  of  finality,  universality,  authority,  but 
a  process  which  had  its  raison  d'etre  in  the  foundation  of  dogma  on 
the  basis  of  ancient  Greek  philosophy.  The  church  as  institution 
gradually  assumed  control  and  lordship  over  philosophy,  and  made 
it  the  instrument  whereby  the  process  of  systematizing  and  fixing 
dogma  was  maintained.  Thus  within  the  church  was  a  closed  system 
of  thought,  composed  on  the  one  hand  of  modified  concepts  of  Greek 
philosophy,  and  on  the  other  of  the  results  of  the  elaboration  of  the 
Christian  religion  at  the  hands  of  this  philosophy.  This  philosophic 
elaboration,  to  be  sure,  was  less  original  and  independent  than  in  the 
Patristic  period,  but  it  was  so  simply  because  the  church  as  institu- 
tion had  gradually  gained  complete  control  of  philosophizing  and 
compelled  it  to  subserve  only  the  dogmatic,  institutional  ends  of  the 
church.  All  philosophy  was  church  philosophy,  and  church  phi- 
losophy was  essentially  the  inheritance  passed  down  from  the  Greek 
systems.  This  type  of  thought  within  the  church,  permitted  and  used 
only  for  the  ends  of  the  church,  was  scholastic  theology,  in  its  earlier 
stage.  Analyzed,  it  is  seen  to  consist  of  the  uncritical  use  of  tradi- 
tional concepts  for  the  purpose  of  subserving  the  temporal  as  well  as 
religious  interests  of  the  church,  both  as  religious  institution  and  as 
Holy  Roman  Empire. 

Each  of  these  two  types  of  thought  in   the   first  stage  of  the 
mediaeval  period  existed  in  an  acute  state.     The  barbaric,  naive  con- 
sciousness could  hardly  have  been  more  barbaric,  and  the  scholastic 
discipline  as  a  philosophy  in  the  church,  and  a  philosophy  of  the 
church,  could  hardly  have  been  more  blind,  uncritical,  and  dogmatic. 
Even  the  human  and  psychological  element  introduced  by  Augustine, 
which  was  his  great  and  lasting  contribution  to  the  development  of 
thought,  failed  to  take  root  for  a  period  of  five  hundred  years.     The 
calm  acceptance  and  willing  promotion  of  the  feudal  system  serves  {$&+** 
to  illustrate  the  blind,  unsubjective,  uncritical  type  of  thought  com-    Q»jk+** 
mon  to  the  great  mass  of  people  in  mediaeval  Europe,  while  the  spread      P^  ty 
of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  the  erection  of  magnificent  cathedrals 
and  feudal  castles,  illustrates  as  well  the  institutional,  universally 
authoritative  character  of  the  church  carrying  the  concepts  of  univer- 
sality and  authority  over  from  ancient  philosophy  and  presenting 


10        THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM 

them  to  the  admiration  of  a  nai've  people  and  demanding  their 
servitude. 

Now,  it  is  because  Thomas  Aquinas  brought  to  final  form  the  con- 
cepts involved  in  the  traditional  theology  of  the  church,  and  thus 
completed  the  antithesis  of  these  two  types  of  thought,  that  his  work 
was  of  prime  influence  on  the  results  of  that  contact.  It  would  be 
an  error,  of  course,  to  fix  the  origin  of  modern  individualism  in  any 
historical  situation  brought  about  by  the  life  and  work  of  a  single 
man,  for  in  the  worst  environment  human  nature  still  possesses  a 
tendency  to  develop,  and  the  Catholic  Church,  however  severe  the 
servitude  she  may  bring  to  the  human  spirit,  has  still  ever  exercised 
a  certain  amount  of  pedagogic,  civilizing  influence  over  barbaric 
peoples.  It  is  nevertheless  true  that  the  historic  development  out  of 
which  sprang  the  consciousness  of  the  modern  individual  was  brought 
to  a  crisis  by  the  work  of  Thomas  Aquinas. 

An  analysis  of  the  principles  involved  in  the  system  of  Thomas 
and  the  results  of  their  presentation  to  the  naive  consciousness  of 
mediaeval  Europe  constitutes  in  detail  the  task  of  the  following 
sections. 


II. 

THOMAS'  FUNDAMENTAL  DISTINCTION   BETWEEN  FAITH 

AND  REASON. 

The  central  point  of  the  Thomistic  system,  from  which  the  entire 
Summa  Theologies  logically  radiates,  is  the  distinction  between  faith 
and  reason. 

The  problem  of  the  relation  of  faith  and  reason,  the  fact  that  they 
were  presented  to  Thomas  as  related  elements  to  be  discriminated, 
is  due,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  strong  current  of  orthodox  mysticism 
proceeding  from  Bernard  of  Clairveaux  (d.  1153)  and  the  Victorines 
(Hugo,  d.  1141;  Richard,  d.  1173);  on  the  other  hand,  to  an  increasing 
scientific  study  of  nature  (Gerbert,  d.  1003;  John  of  Salisbury,  d.  1180) 
and  the  revival  of  Aristotelian  logic. 

Truth,  according  to  Thomas,  in  its  last  analysis,  is  unitary,  but 
in  its  mode  of  apprehension  is  double  (duplex  veritatis  modus).  There 
is  truth  which  transcends  all  human  power  of  understanding  (ratio): 
for  example,  God  is  three  and  one.  But  there  is  also  truth  which  is 
attainable  by  natural  reason  (ratio).  The  distinction  here,  however, 
is  not  on  the  side  of  truth,  but  on  the  side  of  our  mode  of  apprehen- 
sion (cognitio).  That  is,  final  truth  cannot  possess  a  double,  contra- 
dictory character.  Nor  does  the  double  mode  of  apprehension  of 
truth  determine  the  line  of  division  between  the  natural  and  the 
supernatural,  for  certain  truths  pertaining  to  God  are  attainable  by 
reason  (ratio),  since  the  study  of  nature,  though  incomplete,  invari- 
ably leads  back  to  a  certain  amount  of  knowledge  of  God.  The  sub- 
ject-matter of  faith  and  of  reason  thus  overlap,  and  this  is  because, 
on  the  one  hand,  the  end  of  all  thought,  hence  of  reason,  as  such,  is 
divine  truth,  ultimately  God,  the  one  unitary  Truth;  and  on  the  other 
hand  because  the  great  mass  of  mankind,  the  unlearned,  the  care- 
worn, the  dull  and  the  lazy,  would  never  possess  the  truth  were  it  not 
attainable  by  some  other  mode  than  the  process  of  science  and  logic. 
There  is,  then,  for  divine  truth,  a  double  mode  of  apprehension,  faith 
and  reason.  Reason  can  apprehend  certain,  but  not  all  divine  truth, 
but  where  the  rational  process  ceases,  faith  begins  for  each  individual 
and  the  realm  of  truth  is  still  open  to  him. 

11 


12        THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM 

According  to  Thomas,  it  follows  from  the  foregoing  that  there  is 
a  double  source  of  knowledge  of  divine  truth,  namely,  divine  reve- 
lation and  human  reason.  The  highest  good,  to  whose  attainment  all 
humanity  is  directed,  transcends  all  which  the  present  life  can  experi- 
ence or  know.  But  nothing  can  be  held  as  an  ideal  or  goal  which  is 
not  first  cognized,  hence  this  highest,  super-rational  good,  must  be 
revealed.  Thus  we  know  God  truly  when  we  think  Him  exalted 
above  all  which  man  can  think  about  God.  Thomas  seems  to  mean  by 
this  that  when  the  concepts  of  reason  have  been  exhausted  in  defining 
the  attributes  of  God,  revelation  declares  that  God  is  still  more  and 
greater,  and  faith  gives  assent,  and  since  the  source  of  the  "higher 
truth"  is  revelation,  faith  has  precedence  over  reason  even  to  trans- 
cending the  latter,  as,  for  example,  in  the  proposition,  Deum  trinum 
esse  et  unum. 

But  if  man  must  thus  believe  super-rational,  divine  things,  lest 
faith  fail  to  hold  its  own  in  the  world  of  the  real  and  rational,  and  lest 
it  become  a  vague,  indifferent  attitude  or  act  of  mind,  revelation  must 
be  mediated  to  man  by  way  of  the  corporeal  and  historical.  Hence 
signs  and  wonders,  miracles  of  healing,  etc.,  to  establish  the  credi- 
bility of  the  super-rational  truth.  Again,  if  this  revelation  is  neces- 
sary in  order  to  man's  attainment  of  the  highest  good,  then  there  can 
be  no  contradiction  between  the  truths  of  reason  and  the  truths  of  reve- 
lation, for  such  a  contradiction  would  set  up  an  essential,  insurmount- 
able opposition  between  man  and  his  highest  good.  The  unavoidable 
difficulty  here  is  evaded  by  Thomas  by  the  assertion  that  whatever 
revealed  seems  to  contradict  reason  is  Christian  mystery,  and  God  is 
its  source,  and  great  are  the  mysteries.  The  mysteries  of  Christianity 
cannot  be  apodictically  demonstrated  or  comprehended. 

On  the  basis  of  this  relationship  of  faith  and  reason  to  truth, 
Thomas  discusses  the  content  of  the  mind  in  its  attitude  toward 
recognized  truth,  and  develops  the  notions  of  knowledge,  faith  (or 
belief),  and  opinion.  The  intellect  assents  to  anything  in  two  ways: 

(a)  By  being  moved  to  assent  by  the  object  itself,  cognition 
taking  place  by  reason  of  an  immediate  appeal  to  known  qualities; 
or  by  being  moved  by  some  other  thing,  so  that  cognition  takes  place 
mediately,  in  conclusions  by  known  terms.     And 

(b)  By  being  moved  by  a  volutary  impulse,  choice.     In  this  case, 
(the  willing  to  believe),  if  doubt  is  still  mingled  with  the  intellectual 
assent,  it  is  opinion;  if  all  doubt  is  eliminated,  it  is  faith  or  belief. 

The  fact  that  faith  has  an  element  of  volition  in  it  does  not  give 


THE  GKOUNDS  OF  NON-CATHOLIC  FKEEDOM   13 

the  primacy  to  the  will,  for  even  the  act  of  will  in  determining  intel- 
lectual assent  is  grounded  in  a  habit  of  faith  and  is  indeed  an  act  of 
faith.  Faith  (fides)  thus  stands  midway  between  knowledge  (scientia) 
and  opinion  (opinio).  So  much  for  the  relation  between  faith  and 
knowledge  on  the  subjective  side.  It  is,  however,  the  objective  con- 
ditioning of  the  act  which,  in  Thomas's  view,  fixes  the  abiding  char- 
acter and  relative  value  of  faith  and  knowledge.  For  the  truth 
attained  by  faith,  we  are  indebted  to  authority;  but  for  what  comes 
by  knowledge,  we  are  indebted  to  reason.  Belief  (faith)  rests  upon 
the  objective  ground  of  authority;  knowledge  is  conditioned  by  the 
insight  and  evidence  of  reason.  But  this  authority  for  faith  is  no 
less  than  the  revelation  proceeding  from  God  Himself,  hence  faith 
takes  precedence  over  knowledge;  and  again,  since  God  is  the  abso- 
lute, highest  Truth,  faith  results  in  greater  certainty  than  does  reason. 
Reason  may  err,  but  the  divine  truth  is  infallible.  While  empirical 
facts  stand  as  the  presuppositions  of  faith  (prceambula  fidei),  yet  this 
precedence  of  knowledge  over  faith  is  only  incidental  and  formal. 
The  function  of  faith,  as  related  to  objective  authority,  and  the 
material  with  which  faith  deals,  make  faith  the  guiding  principle, 
the  norm  for  reason  in  all  investigation  and  scientific  elaboration  of 
Christian  truth.  Moreover,  the  formal  precedence  of  empirical 
knowledge  as  presupposition  of  faith  is  limited  strictly  to  the  empirical 
facts  of  Christianity,  and  so  again  the  ultimate  priority  of  faith  is 
shown,  since  Christianity  is  larger  than  empirical  facts,  and  is  drawn 
from  a  supernatural  source. 

The  relation  between  science  and  faith,  between  philosophy  and 
theology,  is  thus  the  relation  of  servant  to  master.  Philosophy  forms 
the  presupposition  of  theology  only  in  the  sense  that  theology  calls 
in  philosophy  as  an  aid  for  the  purpose  of  elaborating  and  codifying 
the  truth  already  established  theologically  by  revelation  and  faith. 
The  will  to  believe  thus  lies  at  the  very  basis  of  the  rational  process, 
and  in  essence  and  in  act,  this  will  belongs  to  the  realm  of  faith. 
Philosophy  is  the  science  of  reason;  theology  is  the  science  of  reve- 
lation. The  source  of  knowledge  for  philosophy  is  likewise  reason, 
and  the  source  for  theology  is  revelation.  One  treats  truth  in  so  far 
as  it  can  be  proved  by  reason;  the  other  treats  it  in  so  far  as  it  is  re- 
vealed by  God,  and  each  is  an  integral,  unitary  science.  Philosophy 
treats  of  creation  in  its  essence  and  attributes,  while  theology  treats 
it  in  its  relation  to  God.  Philosophy  establishes  its  proof  on  the 
nature  of  the  thing;  theology  rests  proof  on  the  source  of  the  thing. 


14        THE   GROUNDS   OF  NON-CATHOLIC   FREEDOM 

From  the  examination  of  the  essence,  properties,  and  laws  of  created 
things,  philosophy  rises  to  consideration  and  knowledge  (limited)  of 
God.  Theology  reverses  this  method.  From  consideration  of  God 
and  His  attributes,  theology  descends  to  created  things  in  order  to 
examine  their  relation  to  God.  Theology  is  thus  prior  in  char- 
acter, in  subject-matter,  in  method,  and  uses  philosophy  as  her  hand- 
maiden. This  use  of  philosophy  introduces  into  theology  a  specu- 
lative moment. 

Such,  in  brief,  is  the  Thomistic  distinction  between  faith  and 
reason  and  the  corresponding  conceptions  deduced. 

One  may  see  at  a  glance  that  the  distinction  with  all  its  conse- 
quences is  unqualifiedly  based  on  the  Roman  Catholic  principle  of 
dualism  between  nature  and  the  supernatural,  between  the  universal 
and  the  particular,  and  on  the  conception  of  salvation  as  a  supra- 
mundane  condition  to  be  realized  finally  by  participation  in  super- 
rational  reality.  By  the  entire  method  and  content  of  his  statement, 
Thomas  is  committed  to  the  Catholic  principle  of  uncritical  assent  to 
truth,  and  truth  is  clearly  conceived  according  to  the  contention  of 
realism.  Indeed,  by  birth,  by  training,  and  by  the  voluntary  direc- 
tion and  use  of  magnificent  natural  powers  as  well  as  broad  erudition, 
Thomas  is  a  Catholic  of  the  Catholics,  and  his  Summa  Theologice  is 
the  final  expression  of  the  universality,  infallibility,  and  authority 
of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  and  the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  Faith 
and  reason,  at  the  center  of  the  Thomistic  system,  are  essentially 
and  typically  the  faith  and  reason-  of-the-Graeco-Roman-Scholastic 
mediaeval-  church  institution. 


III. 

THE  THOMISTIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  FAITH  AND  REASON  IN 
RELATION  TO  MODERN  INDIVIDUALISM. 

At  first  sight  the  foregoing  scholastic  conceptions  of  truth,  reve- 
lation, reason,  philosophy,  and  theology,  with  the  underlying  dis- 
crimination between  faith  and  reason,  would  appear  to  be  diamet- 
rically opposed  to  the  modern  definition  of  these  terms.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  there  is  hardly  an  element — intellectual,  moral,  or 
religious — involved  in  the  conception  of  the  modern  individual, 
which  is  not  concealed  in  the  above  fundamental  concepts  as  stated 
and  used  by  Thomas  Aquinas. 

It  is  to  be  first  noted  that  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  faith  and 
reason  is  a  psychological  problem,  though,  of  course,  Thomas  did  not 
recognize  it  primarily  as  such,  and  stated  it  merely  in  the  interests  of 
the  truth  as  held  by  the  Catholic  Church.  Thomas's  statement  of  the 
subjective  aspect  of  knowledge,  faith,  and  opinion  is  clearly  the 
revival  of  the  psychological  interest  created  by  Augustine,  disre- 
garded for  five  hundred  years,  then  again  coming  to  the  fore  in  the 
two  centuries  preceding  Thomas.  Thomas's  connection  here  with 
modern  psychology  is  not  indeed  that  he  valued  psychology  as  funda- 
mental, nor  that  he  gave  any  thorough  or  extended  psychological 
statement  of  his  problem,  but  it  is  that  the  distinction  between  faith 
and  reason  is  in  fact  simply  a  psychological  distinction,  however 
inadequately,  or,  according  to  modern  method,  unscientifically  ex- 
pressed. Since  this  distinction  was  the  central  and  fundamental 
principle  in  Thomas's  system,  and  since  his  system  was  the  final 
statement  of  Catholicism,  the  relation  of  faith  and  reason  was  thus 
raised  to  the  degree  of  fundamental  importance.  A  rudimentary 
psychology  was  thus  legitimized  within  the  Catholic  Church,  and  at 
the  moment  Catholic  theology  was  made  a  closed  and  final  system, 
and  by  the  very  effort  that  made  it  such,  there  was  legitimized  a  • 
fundamental  principle  which  three  centuries  later,  though  not  scien- 
tifically valued,  nevertheless  served  to  destroy  the  system  which  had 
been  based  upon  it.  For  what  was  the  Reformation,  if  not  primarily 
the  recognition  of  faith  and  reason,  and  their  mutual  relationship, 

15 


16        THE    GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM 

as  fundamental?  Thomas  Aquinas  gave  prime  importance  and 
validity  to  faith  and  reason  stated  in  terms  of  objective  truth  and 
their  relation  to  this  truth.  But  the  fundamental  validity  and  impor- 
tance of  faith  and  reason  aroused  the  consciousness  of  that  religious, 
rational  subjectivity  which  finally  came  to  expression  in  Martin 
Luther.  Henceforth  faith  and  reason  were  the  instruments  used  in 
behalf  of  a  subject,  not  modes  of  communication  and  control  used  in 
the  interests  of  an  object.  In  other  words,  the  principle  of  faith  and 
reason  as  stated  and  used  by  Thomas  presupposes  the  principle  of 
internality,  which  was,  in  fact,  stated  by  Augustine,  but  in  such  a 
manner  and  under  such  conditions  that  it  was  not  raised  to  the 
position  of  authority  given  it  by  its  use  in  Thomas's  system  and  by 
its  presentation  to  the  type  of  consciousness  represented  by  the 
Germanic  people. 

In  addition  to  this  principle  of  internality,  faith  is  given  a  dynamic 
character  by  the  reference  of  the  act  of  belief  to  the  will.  This  is 
merely  a  subterfuge,  to  be  sure,  for  in  no  other  way  could  Thomas 
account  for  faith  as  an  act  on  a  level  at  least  with  the  clearly  recog- 
nized act  of  reason.  But  having  thus  by  an  appeal  to  will  avoided 
the  Scylla  of  viewing  faith  as  a  vague,  indifferent  state  of  conscious- 
ness, Thomas  at  once  plunges  into  the  Charybdis  of  a  contradiction 
by  referring  will  to  a  habit  of  faith.  Therein  he  is  truly  the  dogmatic 
scholastic.  But  the  element  of  value  here  is  that  though  supernatural, 
objective  truth  is  really  the  goal  of  faith,  in  attempting  to  account 
for  the  act  of  faith  in  attaining  to  the  truth,  Thomas  was  compelled 
to  give  the  act  an  ethical  content.  In  what  respect  does  this  differ 
from  the  faith  of  the  modern  individual?  Only  in  this:  The  faith 
of  Thomas  was  a  religio-rational  process  with  objective  truth  as  its 
goal,  while  the  faith  of  the  modern  individual  is  a  religio-ethical 
process  with  its  goal  subjective.  The  end  of  faith  for  Thomas  was 
knowledge  of  transcendent  truth.  The  end  of  faith  for  the  modern 
individual  is  conduct.  Faith  for  both  lays  hold  on  God  and  links 
the  soul  with  Him.  But  for  Thomas  this  union  is  metaphysical,  a 
state  to  be  perfectly  realized  only  in  the  world  to  come,  for  the  human 
and  the  divine  are  generically  different,  separated  by  the  dualism 
which  cleaves  the  universe  of  reality  into  two  opposed  worlds.  For 
the  modern  individual  this  union  is  ethical,  present,  since  for  him  the 
human  spirit  is  generically  one  with  the  divine,  and  his  one  world 
knows  no  dualism.  But  it  is  precisely  because  Thomas  announced 
as  a  fundamental  presupposition  of  his  closed,  final  system  the  dynamic 


THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC   FKEEDOM       17 

character  of  faith  that  the  faith  of  the  people  awoke  to  the  conscious- 
ness of  its  initiative,  dynamic,  responsible,  ethical  character.  Faith 
and  will,  in  Protestantism,  are  of  the  same  formal  relationship  to  each 
other  and  to  truth  as  in  Thomas's  system,  but  the  act  of  faith  as 
denned  by  Thomas  was  the  first  step  in  the  development  of  a  new 
conception  of  the  function  and  content  of  faith, — a  development  of 
such  momentous  import  that  it  was  no  less  than  the  prime  factor  in 
a  Reformation  which  defined  anew  even  truth  itself. 

Again,  according  to  Thomas,  the  highest  good  is  a  far-off  goal, 
toward  which  faith  and  reason  struggle  on,  assisting  and  supple- 
menting each  other,  though  faith  is  always  prior.  Now,  by  his  defini- 
tion of  truth  and  this  process  of  its  attainment,  it  is  evident  that  faith 
and  reason  are,  after  all,  two  sides  of  a  knowledge  process, — that  is, 
faith  is  a  religio-rational  process  supplementing  the  purely  rational. 
But  what  is  of  significance  here,  is  the  element  of  progress  involved 
in  this  definition  of  the  activity  of  faith  and  reason  in  their  relation 
to  truth.  It  may  not  be  amiss,  therefore,  to  state  that  the  notion  of 
progress,  which  is  the  kernel  of  the  Hegelian  philosophy,  is  the  legiti- 
mate and  final  outcome  of  a  development  which  received  its  initial 
modern  impulse  in  Thomas'  conception  of  the  rational  process  of 
faith  and  reason. 

Of  great  significance  also  is  Thomas'  argument  for  the  propo- 
sition that  faith  and  reason  overlap  in  their  activity.  This,  he  says, 
is  because  the  great  mass  of  men  are  unlearned,  lacking  in  logical 
acumen,  preoccupied,  so  that  exercise  of  reason  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  truth  is  impossible.  Hence  they  have  provided  for  them 
the  instrument  of  faith,  and  revelation  affords  them  many  truths 
which  only  the  few  can  attain  by  reason.  This  was,  in  purpose,  an 
argument  to  establish  the  comprehensive  scope  of  revelation  and  its 
priority  over  reason,  and  was  thus  purely  Catholic.  But  it  is  also,  in 
fact,  a  direct  argument  for  the  possibility  of  the  exercise  of  faith  and 
the  attainment  of  truth  by  the  humblest  man.  What  more  direct 
and  what  greater  impulse  toward  the  freedom  of  the  individual  could 
be  given?  Thomas  supposed  he  was  serving  the  Roman  Church, 
making  secure  her  authority  by  thus  establishing  the  priority  and  scope 
of  revelation.  But  the  very  effort  to  do  this  in  reality  freed  faith  and 
reason  from  the  confines  of  the  clerical  oligarchy.  Had  the  writings 
of  Aquinas  been  accessible  to  the  common  people,  the  Protestant 
Reformation  would  have  followed  close  on  the  Summa  Theologies,  and 
it  would  have  found  its  text  for  freedom  and  subjectivity  in  the  very 


18        THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM 

words  with  which  the  champion  of  Catholicism  sought  to  extend, 
strengthen,  and  complete  the  authority  and  rule  of  the  Catholic 
Church.  The  na'ive  mass  of  German  people  could  not  read  the  letter 
of  Thomas'  system,  but  men  breathed  the  spirit  of  freedom  with 
which,  all  unwittingly,  he  had  freighted  the  letter;  slowly  this  spirit 
of  freedom  came  to  expression,  and  finally  Martin  Luther,  the  son  of 
Vj^'a  peasant  slate-cutter,  took  Thomas  Aquinas  at  his  word,  and  declared 
the  substance  of  faith  to  be  ethical  will,  and  the  human  spirit  free, 
dynamic,  responsible,  related  immediately  to  revelation  and  to  God, 
the  source  of  all  truth.  That  priority  of  faith  over  reason,  for  which 
&fr  Thomas  so  ardently  contended,  was  Martin  Luther's  text  for  the 
essentially  religious  character  of  the  human  spirit,  and  inasmuch  as 
faith  is  free  and  to  be  freely  exercised  by  all,  a  text  also  for  the  religious 
independence  of  the  individual. 

The  influence  of  the  ethical  element  in  Thomas'  definition  of  faith 
is  clearly  seen  in  the  fact  that  Duns  Scotus  (d.  1380)  immediately 
followed  with  his  philosophy  of  will.  Again,  the  influence  of  Thomas' 
distinction  between  faith  and  reason  is  seen  in  the  Scotist  formal 
separation  of  religion  and  science,  a  division  which  it  was,  in  fact, 
one  of  the  great  purposes  of  the  Summa  Theologioe  to  make  impossible. 
And  again,  following  the  cue  given  by  Thomas's  characterization  of 
the  priority  of  faith  and  its  rationalistic  nature  in  relation  to  objective 
truth,  Eckhart  (d.  1329)  developed  his  idealistic  mysticism,  which 
wanted  only  the  ethical  moment,  appearing  later  in  the  Reformation, 
to  be  truly  Protestant  in  character. 

The  program  for  modern  science  is  clearly  laid  down  in  Thomas' 
distinction  between  reason  and  faith,  and  the  subject-matter  and 
method  ascribed  to  each.  Faith  starts  with  the  conception  of  God, 
from  that  works  downward  to  the  world  of  matter  in  order  to  examine 
the  relation  of  God  to  created  things.  This  is  clearly  and  explicitly 
the  deductive  method  of  the  Hellenistic-scholastic  philosophy.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  reason  starts  with  created  things,  and  works 
upward  through  examination  of  them  to  a  certain  amount  of  knowl- 
edge about  God  and  the  relation  of  the  world  to  God.  This  is  purely 
the  inductive  method,  to-day  fundamental  for  every  science.  Here 
again,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  Thomas  did  not  purposely  announce  a 
new  program  for  science.  He  meant  only  to  distinguish  between 
the  reverse  methods  of  faith  and  reason,  solely  for  the  purpose  of 
establishing  the  priority  of  the  former,  for  God,  supernatural  truth, 
is  the  subject-matter  of  faith  as  against  created  things,  the  subject- 


THE   GROUNDS   OF   NON-CATHOLIC   FREEDOM       19 

matter  of  reason.  Following  out  this  distinction  of  method  for  faith 
and  reason,  Thomas  consistently  related  theology  and  philosophy  in 
the  same  manner,  but  with  the  result  that  the  world  of  things  thus 
became  the  primary  subject-matter  of  philosophy.  There  is  thus  a 
remarkable  transition  of  philosophy  from  ancient  metaphysics,  the 
scholastic  field,  to  physics,  while  theology  occupies  the  metaphysical 
realm  as  sole  master.  The  transition  was  but  partial,  however,  for 
philosophy  was  still  metaphysics  in  the  sense  that  it  is  used  as  a 
logical  aid  for  clarifying  and  elaborating  the  truth  given  in  revelation 
and  maintained  by  theology.  Nevertheless,  under  the  name  of  phi- 
losophy, scientific  research  was  given  its  freedom,  its  method  was 
declared  inductive,  and  by  declaring  reason  the  obverse  method  of 
faith  for  every  individual  in  his  upward  struggle  for  truth,  reason, 
therefore  philosophy,  and  therefore  science,  were  declared  the  posses- 
sions and  the  instruments  of  the  individual,  not  of  the  church.  This 
was  furthest  from  Thomas'  explicit  purpose.  It  was  his  purpose  to 
include  all  knowledge,  all  science,  in  his  Summa  Theologice,  the  final 
expression  of  the  universal  intellectual  and  religious  proprietorship 
of  the  church.  But  by  making  fast  this  feudalism  of  the  church 
through  the  religious  (revelation,  faith)  rule  and  priority,  he  so 
defined  reason  (philosophy,  study  of  nature)  as  an  aid  to  faith  and 
theology  that  he  over-reached  his  own  purpose  and  gave  science  a 
far  more  important  and  independent  task  and  method  than  was  in 
any  sense  consistent  with  its  intended  character  as  the  bond-servant 
of  the  church. 

A  decisive  moment  for  the  freeing  of  reason  as  scientific  research 
was  also  implicit  in  Thomas'  conception  of  reason  in  contrast  to 
revelation  as  a  source  of  truth.  The  parallelism  based  on  the  distinc- 
tion between  faith  and  reason  breaks  down  at  the  last  moment.  The 
two  realms  of  truth  (although  truth  is  unitary)  are  the  natural  and 
the  supernatural.  The  two  beings  with  whom  truth  is  concerned  are 
God  and  Man.  The  two  sources  of  truth  are  revelation  and  reason. 
But  the  two  modes  of  the  apprehension  of  truth  are  faith  and  reason. 
Reason  thus  appears  twice,  as  both  source  and  mode  of  apprehension 
of  truth.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  great  world  of  supernatural 
truth,  presented  to  man  as  revelation,  this  contrast  of  revelation  and 
reason,  a§  sources,  belittles  man's  reason.  This  was  precisely 
Thomas'  point  of  view.  But  it  follows  with  equal  certainty  that 
whoever  would  take  the  scientific  point  of  view  and  look  upon  the 
exercise  of  reason  as  in  itself  a  source  for  truth,  would  put  an  equally 


20       THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM 

high  estimate  on  reason,  not  as  contrasted,  but  as  yoked  with  reve- 
lation. This  was  bound  to  result,  moreover,  because  this  coupling 
of  reason  with  revelation  had  been  finally  and  authoritatively  stated 
by  the  church  itself,  in  its  effort  to  dominate  the  entire  field  of 
reason,  and  subjugate  it  to  the  realm  of  revelation  and  faith. 

It  was  of  small  moment  that  in  providing  against  this  homage  to 
reason  Thomas  should  define  it,  not  in  terms  of  individual,  scientific 
research,  but  as  the  universal,  natural  fountain  of  knowledge.  How- 
ever abstract  he  might  make  the  conception  of  reason,  men  realized 
immediately  on  applying  the  program  that  it  was  their  own  individual, 
rational,  scientific  endeavors  which  really  afforded  them  access  to 
the  truths  of  nature.  The  effort  to  refute  this  position  would,  there- 
fore, appear  to  be  a  mere  subterfuge,  and  would  so  much  the  more 
hasten  the  freedom  of  science  and  its  honor  as  an  independent,  reliable 
source  of  truth. 

If  we  were  to  try  to  explain  this  free  scientific  impulse  implicit  in 
Thomas  Aquinas,  in  spite  of  his  championship  of  the  absolute,  dog- 
matic authority  of  the  church,  we  might  refer  to  the  humanist  reac- 
tion of  the  preceding  century  against  the  extreme,  one-sided,  scholastic, 
dogmatic  method  of  the  schools.  But  that  would  not  in  the  least 
invalidate  the  assertion  that  for  the  modern  period  the  roots  of  scien- 
tific freedom  and  of  the  inductive  method  as  applied  to  science  are 
to  be  found  in  the  ground  principle  of  Thomas  Aquinas'  system. 
For  in  saying  the  last  thing  in  behalf  of  the  universal  control  of  the 
church,  Thomas  expressed  the  Catholic  idea  with  such  clearness  and 
decisiveness,  that  the  definition  of  the  new  method  and  subject-matter 
for  reason  (philosophy  and  natural  science), —  incidentally  given, 
indeed, —  obtained  like  decisiveness  and  significance  for  succeeding 
time. 

Finally,  what  is  of  greatest  significance  for  modern  individualism, 
is  the  destruction  of  the  ancient  dualism  between  nature  and  the 
supernatural,  by  Thomas'  definition  of  truth  and  by  the  implication 
in  his  definition  of  the  related  activities  of  faith  and  reason. 

Thomas  very  definitely  opposed  the  earlier  mediaeval  conception 
of  truth  as  "two-fold."  He  declared  that  truth  is  one,  unitary, 
because  God  is  the  source  of  all  truth.  He  maintained  that  the  truths 
of  reason  and  those  of  faith  could  never  contradict  each  other;  that 
which  contradicts  one,  contradicts  the  other.  This,  however,  was  not 
intended  to  obliterate  the  distinction  between  nature  and  the  super- 
natural as  two  different  realms,  for  the  definition  of  truth  as  "two- 


THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM       21 

fold"  was  a  contention  between  natural  and  revealed  theology,  not 
between  empirical  science  and  theology.  It  is  reason  exercised  with 
the  purpose  of  aiding  faith  in  the  appropriation  of  revelation,  of  which 
Thomas  speaks.  According  to  Thomas,  there  are  two  distinct  realms, 
this  world  and  a  higher,  and  the  truth,  the  highest  good  toward  which 
humanity  must  struggle,  is  the  truth  of  the  higher  realm,  even  the 
truth  of  God  Himself.  That  higher  world  is  absolutely  severed  from 
this  world.  Between  the  two  there  is  absolutely  no  connection  save 
that  of  grace  and  revelation.  But  while  man  must  live  his  life  in  this 
world  only  to  prepare  for  life  in  another  world,  this  however  is 
true:  truth  as  man  knows  it,  by  reason  in  the  things  of  this  world, 
by  faith  in  the  things  of  the  other  world,  is  unitary.  While  man  must 
live  in  two  worlds,  he  knows  but  one  truth.  No  truth  of  the  present 
life  can  set  aside  the  revealed  truth  of  the  life  to  come,  and  if  there 
seems  to  be  a  contradiction  between  the  truth  of  reason  and  that  of 
revelation,  if,  for  example,  man  reasons  that  three  people  are  three 
people,  but  believes  by  faith  that  one  God  is  three  persons,  the  diffi- 
culty is  not  with  truth,  but  with  the  temporary  limitations  of  man's 
vision  of  the  truth.  Reason  must  gracefully  yield  to  faith,  for,  who 
can  say,  is  not  reason  bound,  by  its  very  nature  and  function,  in 
some  good  time  of  fruition  to  understand  the  truth  of  faith,  though 
now  it  can  see  only  through  a  glass  darkly?  So,  Thomas  affirms, 
whatever  may  seem  to  be  true  for  the  moment,  truth  really  and  ulti- 
mately is  one.  On  one  side  this  fixes  more  firmly  than  ever  the 
dualism  between  the  two  worlds,  for  it  emphasizes  the  supernatural 
even  to  the  extent  of  discrediting  man's  rational  powers  for  the  sake 
of  truth  attained  by.  faith. 

But  there  is  another  side,  and  the  implication  is  a  mighty  one. 
If  truth,  in  spile  of  reason,  is  true  for  both  worlds,  wherein  exists  the 
real  distinction  between  the  natural  and  the  supernatural?  The  dis- 
tinction which  Thomas  makes  is  the  difference  between  the  material, 
visible  world  and  the  spiritual;  but  if  these  come  together  in  their 
truth,  in  their  meaning  for  the  human  spirit,  wherein  does  there  still 
exist  any  distinction  whatever?  The  only  remaining  distinction 
possible  is  one  of  time  and  space,  a  difference  in  corporeality.  This 
is  indeed  the  Thomistic,  Platonic-realistic  basis  of  the  distinction 
between  the  natural  and  the  supernatural,  and  is  clearly  indicated  in 
his  Angelology,  and  in  his  treatment  of  the  principle  of  individuation. 
It  is  by  no  means  a  new  distinction  for  Thomas.  It  is  as  old  as  Greek 
philosophy,  and  is  the  basis  for  the  entire  supernaturalistic  and  escha- 


22       THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM 

tological  dogma  of  the  Catholic  Church.  But  by  claiming  that  there 
is  no  dualism  in  truth,  while  still  asserting  the  reality  of  another  world, 
Thomas  implies  an  entirely  new  conception  of  reality,  and  contradicts 
himself.  The  momentous  implication  is  that  the  present  world  is 
spiritualized,  for  by  this  means  only  can  the  unity  of  truth  be  main- 
tained. But  if  this  world  is  spiritualized,  it  simply  is  one  with  the 
spiritual  world,  that  is,  there  is  generically  but  one  World,  one  universe 
of  Reality  for  the  human  spirit.  What  is  here,  and  what  is  true  now, 
is  to  be  thought  and  expressed  in  terms  of  the  world  of  spirit  and 
spiritual  truth;  that  is,  this  world  is  but  one  phase  of  the  unitary 
Spiritual  Reality.  That  this  is  the  unavoidable  implication  in 
Thomas'  conception  of  truth  may  be  clearly  seen  also  in  his  definition 
of  the  functions  of  faith  and  reason.  Faith  is  prior;  that  is,  man  is 
primarily  and  essentially  spiritual,  for  faith  is  the  organ  of  the 
spirit,  and  the  means  of  attaining  spiritual  truth.  But  though  faith 
has  infinite  truth  for  its  subject-matter,  it  also  has  finite  truth 
(i.  e.,  truth  which  can  be  attained  by  reason);  for  revelation, Thomas 
clearly  says,  extends  to  these  things,  because  without  this  wide  scope 
of  revelation  the  great  mass  of  unthinking  men  would  not  be  able  to 
possess  the  truth,  and  faith  is  the  organ  in  them  whereby  this  reve- 
lation is  appropriated;  that  is,  the  less  capable  of  logic  a  man  is, 
by  so  much  the  more  must  he  be  essentially  spiritual  in  the  exercise 
of  his  faculties,  in  his  hold  on  truth,  though  of  course  he  cannot  know 
any  more  truth  than  the  man  who  attains  a  part  of  this  truth  by 
philosophy.  It  is  very  evident,  therefore,  on  the  side  of  faith,  that 
Thomas'  definition  of  truth  and  the  process  of  appropriation  of  it 
results  simply  in  spiritualizing  all  truth  and  the  means  of  its  appre- 
hension; that  is,  the  real  dualism  between  the  natural  and  the 
supernatural  is  obliterated.  But  when  we  turn  to  the  function  of 
reason,  this  is  still  more  evident.  Reason  deals  first  with  the  world 
of  things,  in  order  to  find  its  way  to  God.  But  again,  it  elaborates 
the  truth  which  faith  supplies,  and  in  doing  this  distinctly  enters  the 
field  of  the  spiritual.  But  further,  if  reason,  dealing  with  the  world  of 
things,  is  led  to  the  spiritual, — that  is,  if  the  truth  discovered  in  nature 
is  spiritual  truth, — how  can  the  conclusion  be  avoided  that  the  dis- 
tinctive field  of  reason  is  as  truly  spiritual  as  the  field  of  faith?  That 
is,  again,  reason  in  its  function  and  activity  is  as  truly  spiritual  as 
*  faith,  though,  according  to  Thomas,  and  in  th6  interests  of  revelation 
and  the  church,  not  so  exclusively  spiritual.  The  clear  implication, 
therefore,  fundamental  in  Thomas'  system,  is  that  there  is  no  dualism 


/  OF 

UNIVE 


THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM       23 

between  nature  and  Spirit,  between  Man  and  God,  though  his  effort 
was  to  maintain  such  a  dualism,  with  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  in 
the  breach  as  mediator. 

Now  this  spiritualization  of  the  world  is  at  the  very  core  of  the 
Protestant  principle.  The  modern  individual,  stated  in  religious  terms, 
has  one  world,  one  life,  one  present,  energizing,  All-Father,  and  the 
human  spirit  is  generically  one  with  the  divine.  Eternal  life  is  now. 
Communion  and  union  with  God  are  as  distinctly  real  now  as  they 
ever  can  be,  at  least  potentially  so.  There  is  no  "New  Jerusalem," 
no  Judgment,  no  Salvation,  other  than  the  temple  of  the  human 
spirit  where  God  and  Man  meet;  the  judgment-bar  of  the  human 
conscience  enlightened  by  the  divine  Presence;  the  Salvation  of 
human  character  by  the  power  of  God  that  "worketh  in"  the  human 
spirit.  But  this  may  be  entirely  and  simply  the  elaboration  of  the 
text  of  Thomas  Aquinas'  definition  of  truth,  faith,  and  reason,  though 
it  is  indeed  infinitely  far  removed  from  his  conception  of  God,  Man, 
and  Salvation. 

Conversely,  stated  in  terms  of  philosophy,  the  modern  individual 
naturalizes  the  world  of  spirit.  That  is,  the  world  of  things  exists 
only  in  terms  of  psychic  experience,  and  all  truth,  whether  of  past 
present,  or  future,  is,  and  is  stated  to  the  human  mind,  only  in  terms 
of  its  own  experience.  But  this  is  "natural."  It  is  the  order  of  the 
world,  and  it  is  truly  spiritual,  which  means,  simply,  psychic.  Phi- 
losophy, therefore,  like  theology,  denies  another  world  of  time  and 
space  to  which  alone  the  category  "spiritual"  can  apply.  And 
theology,  like  philosophy,  denies  any  reality  of  the  present  world 
which  cannot  be  stated  in  terms  of  the  experience  of  the  human  spirit. 
"Natural"  and  "supernatural,"  for  both  philosophy  and  theology, 
are  simply  different  terms  in  a  unitary  spiritual  reality.  But  this  is 
implicit  in  the  unitary  truth,  and  in  reason  and  faith,  two  modes  of 
apprehension  of  the  truth,  as  defined  by  Thomas  Aquinas. 

It  is  not  claimed,  of  course,  that  the  foregoing  connections  of 
Thomas  Aquinas'  fundamental  principle  with  the  modern  view  of 
the  individual  cannot  be  traced,  in  part  at  least,  to  other  pre- 
Reformation  systems  of  thought,  both  before  and  after  Thomas.  The 
contention  is  simply  that  Thomas'  contribution  to  the  development 
of  the  modern  individual  is  decisive,  more  decisive  than  that  of  any 
other  man  or  system  of  the  mediaeval  period,  and  this  is  due  to  new 
increments  which  his  system  added  to  the  growing  spirit  of  freedom 
in  the  Germanic  people,  as  well  as  to  the  authoritative  character  given 


24       THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM 

to  his  principles  by  the  authority  which  he  occupied  in  church  and 
state,  and  to  the  finished,  comprehensive  statement  which  he  gave 
to  existing  knowledge.  While  Thomas  lived,  he  might  largely  influ- 
ence the  interpretation  placed  on  his  own  literary  production.  But 
when  he  had  passed  away,  men  began  to  study  the  Summa  as  text, 
and  inevitably  the  universal  method  of  commentary  and  interpre- 
tation began,  with  the  necessary  result  that  fragmentary  portions  of 
his  works  were  studied  simply  for  what  they  contained,  not  in  relation 
to  the  whole,  or  in  the  spirit  in  which  the  whole  system  was  conceived. 
Taken  critically,  and  by  this  method,  there  are  parts  of  Thomas' 
system  upon  which  the  whole  modern  religious  and  scientific  develop- 
ment might  be  legitimately  based,  and  it  is  clearly  certain,  that  at 
the  very  center  of  his  system,  in  spirit,  in  method,  in  point  of  view, 
the  modern  individual  is  concealed.  It  needed  only  some  patient 
prying  on  the  part  of  the  growing,  critical,  inquisitive  German  spirit 
to  bring  him  forth. 


•x» 


IV. 

THE  THOMISTIC  DOGMA  "CHURCH." 

The  Catholic  theology  of  the  last  seven  centuries  has  been  the 
theology  of  Thomas  Aquinas.  With  the  exception  of  a  more  polemical 
definition  of  the  Authority  of  the  Catholic  Church  by  Cardinal  Bellar- 
mine  (d.  1621),  and  the  Vatican  decree  of  Papal  Infallibility  (1870), 
there  has  been  no  addition  of  moment  to  the  theological  system  of 
Thomas  Aquinas,  and  these  two  additions  are,  in  fact,  only  more 
emphatic  statements  of  the  position  already  clearly  taken  by  Thomas. 
The  remainder  of  this  paper,  therefore,  is  not  simply  a  consideration 
of  the  relation  of  Thomas'  system  in  itself  to  the  modern  spirit,  but 
is  as  truly  an  examination  of  the  relationship  of  Catholicism  as  a 
whole  to  the  modern  development.  The  problem  may  be  stated  thus : 
What  initial  impulse  to  Protestantism  is  contained  in  Catholicism? 
At  the  same  time  the  problem  arises  out  of  conditions  consummating 
at  a  given  time,  namely,  the  completion  by  Thomas  of  the  statement 
of  Catholic  theology,  and  the  presentation  of  this  closed  system  to 
the  growing,  critical  German  mind.  Our  examination,  therefore,  will 
be  held  more  closely  to  the  immediate  relation  of  the  Catholicism  of 
Thomas'  time  to  the  general  type  of  consciousness  of  that  period, 
rather  than  to  the  later  development. 

The  statement  of  the  problem  in  the  above  form  will  be  objected 
to  at  once  by  a  conservative  orthodoxy  which  maintains,  assumes 
rather,  that  an  absolutely  new  religion  was  created  by  the  Fathers 
of  the  Reformation.  To  prove,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  reformers 
simply  grew  out  of  the  Catholicism  of  their  time,  as  branch  grows 
from  trunk,  it  is  necessary  only  to  refer  to  the  high  estimate  which 
they  placed  on  the  oecumenical  symbols.  Calvin  laid  great  stress 
on  the  so-called  Apostolic  symbol.  Luther  estimated  the  Athanasian 
symbol  as  one  of  the  most  beautiful  masterpieces  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
since  Apostolic  times.  Zwingli  regarded  the  oecumenical  symbols 
as  the  faithful  expression  of  Biblical  doctrine.  Melancthon  main- 
tained the  truth  and  pure  Catholicity  of  the  leaders  of  the  Reforma- 
tion on  the  basis  of  their  agreement  with  the  Christian  tradition 
(Catholic).  The  dogmatic  formulas  of  the  Catholic  Church  were 

25 


26        THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM 

worked  over  by  the  reformers  into  Confessions  of  Faith,  which  soon 
became  official  documents,  tests,  for  the  evangelical  communities. 
Article  IX.  of  the  Augsburg  Confession  teaches  that  baptism  is  neces- 
sary to  salvation.  Article  XI.  maintains  private  confession.  The 
Apology  (VII.,  4)  maintains  the  three  sacraments  of  Baptism,  the 
Lord's  Supper,  and  Absolution.  Luther's  Smaller  Catechism  recom- 
mends the  Sign  of  the  Cross  before  the  morning  prayer.  Examples 
of  the  actual  transfer  of  Catholic  dogma  and  ritual  into  the  Protestant 
Confessions  might  be  multiplied.  Finally,  it  may  be  recalled  to  mind 
that  Luther  broke  with  the  Catholic  Church  only  after  the  most  stren- 
uous effort  to  work  a  reformation  within  that  church. 

If  there  is  thus  this  clear,  dogmatic,  documentary  connection  of 
Protestantism  with  Catholicism;  if  the  reformers  were  in  fact  only 
disobedient  children  of  the  mother  church,  it  is  but  natural  that  there 
should  be  found,  on  close  examination,  an  actual  inner,  historical 
connection  upon  which  these  outer  Protestant  continuations  of  Cath- 
olicism really  depend.  Moreover,  in  spite  of  historical  crises  which 
yield  epochs  and  periods,  the  development  of  the  human  race,  whether 
in  science,  art,  politics,  or  religion,  is  continuous,  unbroken.  Every 
new  historical  situation  can  be  understood  and  accounted  for  only 
on  the  basis  of  prior  historical  conditions.  Protestantism,  therefore, 
may  as  well  yield  gracefully  to  the  proposition  that  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church,  in  spite  of  the  bondage  which  it  forces  upon  its  chil- 
dren, is  the  medium  through  which  the  Christian  religion  has  been 
transferred  from  the  Apostles  to  modern  times,  and  is  further,  in  spite 
of  unfaithfulness  to  the  freedom  of  the  human  spirit,  the  parent  stock 
out  of  which  has  sprung  the  free  religious  spirit  of  modern  times. 
So  much  by  way  of  justification  of  the  question:  What  initial  impulse 
to  Protestantism  is  contained  in  Catholicism? 

To  answer  this  question  it  will  be  necessary  first  to  state  the  prin- 
ciples involved  in  the  Catholic  Dogma  "Church"  as  given  in  their 
final  form  by  Thomas  Aquinas.  He  gave,  in  his  systematic,  formal 
expression  of  this  dogma,  no  new  material,  hence  a  very  brief  expo- 
sition of  the  principles  will  suffice. 

(1)  Unity.  The  Catholic  principle  of  unity  sufficed  as  a  prin- 
ciple of  administration  and  propaganda,  as  a  formidable  obstacle  to 
schisms  within  the  church,  and  finally  as  a  basis  of  community  of 
interests  between  peoples  of  widely  divergent  culture  and  customs. 
It  was  on  this  basis  that  the  magnificent  institution  of  the  church 
had  reared  her  traditions,  had  fought  and  conquered  her  enemies, 


THE   GROUNDS   OF   NON-CATHOLIC   FREEDOM      27 

and  by  means  of  her  far-reaching  administrative  organization,  had 
gained  a  political  significance  of  which  kings  and  potentates  were 
compelled  to  take  account.  By  mere  reference  to  her  position  and 
traditions  it  was  possible  to  impose  any  doctrine  whatsoever  upon  a 
semi-barbaric  people,  with  little  fear  of  the  schisms  that  threatened 
only  sporadically  and  with  ill-concealed  timidity.  Such  hardy  souls 
as  dared  to  affirm  any  independence  of  religious  zeal  or  spiritual 
initiative  aside  from  that  dictated  and  sanctioned  by  the  church, 
suffered  a  punishment  swift  and  terrible  in  the  eyes  of  the  unthinking, 
thus  publishing  effectively  and  strengthening  the  administrative  power 
and  unity  of  the  church.  But  if  in  her  administrative  dictates,  the 
church  was  cruel,  arbitrary,  and  oppressive,  yet  by  reason  of  her 
recognized  unity  she  conserved  and  bound  together  the  most  diver- 
sified and  antagonistic  elements  of  European  society,  established 
inter-communication,  propagated  knowledge  of  various  customs  and 
arts,  and  in  a  way  made  herself  the  clearing-house  for  social,  political, 
and  educational  influences  at  a  time  when  the  mingling  and  friction 
of  various  degrees  of  culture  were  necessary  for  the  moral  advancement 
of  European  peoples.  But  again,  the  binding  force  of  this  authori- 
tative unity,  while  conservative  and  helpful  in  the  days  of  semi- 
barbarism,  became  a  positive  check  and  hindrance  as  soon  as  men 
learned  to  think  independently,  and  in  their  intellectual  efforts 
attached  to  the  culture  and  freedom  of  Greek  antiquity. 

(2)  Catholicity.     Closely  allied  to  the  principle  of  unity  was  the 
principle  of  catholicity:   the  dogma  of  the  universal  claim  of  the 
church  to  the  subservience  and  homage  of  all  men  of  all  times.     In 
her  adherence  to  this  principle  the  church  not  only  fostered  a  mis- 
sionary propaganda,  but  became  the  church  militant,  claiming  by 
right  of  divine  institution  the  souls  of  all  men, —  to  be  gained  by  the 
peaceful  means  of  appeal  to  the  superstitious  regard  of  her  symbolism 
and  ritual  if  possible,  by  means  of  coercion,  inquisition,  and  political 
intrigue  if  need  be.     Nor  did  this  claim  of  catholicity  extend  merely 
to  the  spiritual  interests  of  men.     It  was  forced  to  cover  all  the  in- 
stitutions and  endeavors  of  men, —  political,  social,  industrial, —  on  the 
assumption  that  the  business  of  life  is  religion,  and  the  one  universal 
dispenser  of  religion  is  the  Catholic  Church,  by  virtue  of  which  office 
all  interests  of  mankind  were  subjugated  to  her  control  and  direction. 

(3)  Sanctity.     The  claims  of  unity  and  catholicity  could  be  urged 
easily  upon  a  people  in  whom  the  religious  sense  was  a  superstitious 
awe  of  the  unseen  spiritual  forces  of  the  world,  if  coupled  with  these 


28       THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM 

claims  was  that  of  sanctity,  participation  in  which  would  secure  the 
soul  against  the  terrors  of  the  dark  beyond,  the  more  so  as  these 
terrors  were  depicted  as  doubly  awful  to  those  who  hesitated  to  come 
within  the  fold  of  the  church,  the  one  and  only  holy  body,  the  only 
source  of  holiness,  and  the  only  retreat  from  the  effects  of  unholiness. 
One  of  the  most  interesting  features  of  historical  Catholicism  is  the 
fact  that  the  church  was  able  so  to  urge  her  claim  of  sanctity  that 
the  mere  denial  of  this  claim  was  easily  stamped  as  the  extreme  and 
last  sin  of  mankind!  The  church  had  only  to  assert  her  claim.  To 
deny  it  was  a  sin  which  far  outweighed  the  balance  of  the  entire 
catalogue  of  man's  sins.  She  could  say  that  God  had  vested  in  her 
absolute  holiness,  and  whoever  dared  to  question  the  assertion  was 
absolutely  unholy.  Thus  ran  the  magic,  but  stupid  argument.  The 
church  could  go  still  further.  She  could  claim  that  in  her  alone  was 
vested  the  entire  dispensation  of  grace,  and  that  without  submission 
to  her,  salvation  from  sin  and  its  punishments  was  impossible,  both 
in  this  life  and  in  the  life  to  come.  And  the  unthinking  —  nay,  the 
sin-burdened,  though  ignorant  —  believed  and  submitted.  If  argu- 
ment were  needed  to  prove  the  claim,  behold  the  rich  symbolism, 
the  great  and  glorious  past,  the  ever-present  tokens  of  a  unified  and 
powerful  institution,  and  a  final — and  to  a  questioning  but  simple- 
minded  people  a  fearfully  convincing — argument,  the  tortures  of  the 
Inquisition !  To  be  sure,  the  Catholic  Church,  attaching  in  its  origin 
to  the  Apostolic  tradition  and  the  Gospel  of  Jesus,  would  not  forget 
altogether  the  teachings  and  spirit  of  early  Christianity.  But  the 
church  found  itself,  in  the  decline  of  Rome  and  the  mediaeval  period, 
confronting  conditions  that  could  not  be  mastered  save  by  the  imme- 
diate presentation  of  visible  symbols  and  accompaniments  of  salva- 
tion, and  the  accumulation,  systematization,  and  extension  of  these 
into  the  gigantic  organism  of  the  Catholic  Church  kept  pace  with  the 
temper  of  the  times.  It  was  not,  in  fact,  an  institution  foisted  upon 
an  unwilling  people,  but  was  welcomed  by  the  masses  as  filling  their 
needs.  The  delegated  and  transferable,  purchasable  sanctity  of  the 
church  was  the  only  safe,  attainable,  sure  sanctity  which  the  times 
could  apprehend. 

(4)  Apostolicity.  But  the  church  was  never  quite  free  from 
the  danger  of  schisms  and  sporadic  internal  reformations,  intellectual 
and  moral,  which  threatened  open  outbreak.  It  was  inevitable,  there- 
fore, that  all  questioning  of  her  authenticity  and  authority  should  be 
at  least  partially  forestalled  by  the  claim  of  apostolicity.  Whence 


THE   GKOUNDS   OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FEEEDOM      29 

her  authority?  God,  Jesus,  Apostles,  Fathers,  Pope.  The  succession 
was  unbroken.  God,  aloof  from  the  world,  was  yet  pleased  to  bridge 
the  chasm  between  infinite  goodness  and  pitiful  sin  by  the  crucified, 
risen  Lord,  and  the  chasm  between  the  cross  and  the  present  by  the 
unbroken  line  of  divinely  chosen  heads  of  the  church.  Outside  of 
this  line  of  succession  was  no  religious  authority,  no  oracles  of  God, 
no  true  worship  or  true  church.  And  nothing  is  more  apparent  than 
that  this  mechanized  religiosity  was  the  only  form  adaptable  to  the 
ignorant  masses  of  mediaeval  Europe.  If  the  God  of  Christianity 
could  not  show  positive  evidence  of  his  connection  with  humanity 
and  his  preparedness  to  save,  as  well  worship  the  blazing  sun,  the 
angry  sea,  the  lightning  flash,  for  here  were  visible,  mysterious  powers 
that  hesitated  not  to  speak,  to  smite,  and  to  bless!  In  proportion 
as  the  religion  of  a  people  is  mechanized  and  materialized  do  such 
elements  as  tradition,  relic,  succession  of  authority,  become  necessary. 
The  mediaeval  believer  was  incapable  of  anything  more  profound  than 
a  crass,  materialistic,  mechanistic  religion.  Hence  the  claim  of  apos- 
tolicity  fitted  well  the  temper  and  demands  of  the  times,  and  it  was, 
for  the  church,  the  outward,  tangible  authority,  where  an  inner, 
guiding  spiritual  principle  was  wanting. 

(5)  Infallibility.  But  in  the  process  of  historical  change  and 
development,  in  the  manifold  political  exigencies,  in  the  larger  and 
larger  problem  of  administrative  diplomacy,  it  could  not  suffice  that 
the  judgment  and  action  of  the  church  should  be  vindicated  by  the 
claim  of  ancient  traditions.  There  was  needed  a  present  vital  prin- 
ciple which  should  suffice  on  all  occasions  to  command  acceptance 
and  obedience  to  the  decrees  of  the  church.  Hence  the  principle, — 
the  pope,  vice-regent  of  God  on  earth.  When  the  pope  speaks,  God 
speaks.  Unquestioning  obedience  and  humble,  faithful  submission  to 
the  church  are  therefore  due  from  all  men.  Here  again  was  a  prin- 
ciple at  one  with  the  consciousness  of  the  times.  A  feudal  system  . 
in  religion  was  a  necessary  accompaniment  of  the  economical  feud- 
alism, which  was  at  once  the  people's  blessing  and  curse,  in  that  it 
was  an  indispensable  conserver  of  order  and  a  quasi-peaceful  means 
of  subsistence,  but  also  a  positive  check  on  individual  development. 
In  like  manner  the  church  held  together,  by  the  dogma  "Church," 
with  all  it  involved,  the  religious  interests  of  the  times,  which  other- 
wise would  have  perished  altogether,  or  dissipated  into  a  multitude 
of  pagan  cults  utterly  devoid  of  even  the  small  modicum  of  original 
Christian  teaching  offered  by  the  church,  and  furnishing  a  basis  for 


30       THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM 

bitter  petty  strifes,  to  the  discomfiture  and  destruction  of  the  social 
order.  If  the  church  repressed  the  individual,  she  nevertheless  con- 
served the  whole,  gave  it  some  outward  semblance  and  some  real 
consciousness  of  homogeneity,  a  basis  for  social  organization  and 
betterment  otherwise  impossible.  To  meet  the  requirements  of  this 
situation  and  this  pedagogic  office,  the  church  found  the  principles 
of  unity,  catholicity,  sanctity,  apostolicity  and  infallibility  absolutely 
necessary  as  instruments  of  organization,  administration,  and  defense, 
and,  however  conceived  or  with  whatever  motives  used,  these  prin- 
ciples were  nevertheless  integral  with  the  spirit  of  the  times,  and 
served  the  times  as  no  other  religious  principles  could. 

Thomas  Aquinas  was  consecrated  to  the  service  of  the  church 
in  his  earliest  infancy.  He  was  educated  by  the  church  as  one  of 
its  most  promising  servants,  as  he  was,  indeed,  by  virtue  of  his  pro- 
found mystical  spirit  and  his  masterful  mind.  In  young  manhood 
he  quickly  took  first  rank  among  the  defenders  and  propagandists 
of  the  Roman  Church,  and  in  political  affairs  was  known  as  one  of 
the  foremost  diplomatists  of  his  time.  It  is  not  strange,  therefore, 
that  he  should  have  given  such  complete,  systematic,  and  logical 
statement  of  the  position  of  the  church.  In  the  Summa  Theologies 
he  set  forth  the  most  orderly  and  complete  statement  of  catholic 
theology  that  has  ever  been  written.  In  fact,  catholic  theology 
attained  its  final  statement  in  the  Summa  Theologies.  Nothing  of 
consequence  has  been  added  to  or  taken  away  from  the  Summa.  If, 
as  is  probably  true,  the  capstone  of  every  historical  system  is  but 
the  foundation-stone  for  the  succeeding  system  of  the  same  generic 
order,  it  might  be  assumed  that  in  some  manner  the  theology  of 
Thomas  Aquinas  was  a  more  or  less  real  foundation  for  the  spirit 
and  theology  of  the  Reformation.  With  the  Thomistic  dogma  of  the 
"Church,"  analyzed  into  its  essential  principles,  and  with  his  defini- 
tion of  reason  and  faith,  with  all  that  definition  involves,  before  us, 
we  are  in  position  to  attempt  further  an  answer  to  the  question, 
What  initial  impulse  to  Protestantism  is  contained  in  Catholicism? 


V. 

THE  LOGIC  OF  CATHOLICISM  AND  PROTESTANTISM. 

It  has  been  assumed  by  many  historians  that  the  essence  of  the 
Reformation  of  the  fifteenth  century  was  a  moral  revolt  against  the 
abuses  of  the  catholic  clergy.  Such  a  result  was,  indeed,  largely 
the  practical  form  which  the  Reformation  took  in  its  earliest  stages. 
But  such  an  explanation  of  the  Reformation  would  fail  utterly  to 
express  the  full  content  of  the  underlying  thought  and  purpose  of  a 
movement  which  resulted  almost  immediately  in  manifold  theological 
systems  and  cults,  in  a  general  outlook  upon  life  best  characterized 
as  a  feeling  of  freedom.  The  real  religious  principle  of  the  Reforma- 
tion as  held  by  Luther  was  "Justification  by  faith,"  the  material 
principle,  and  the  "Inspiration  of  the  Scriptures,"  the  formal  prin- 
ciple. Justification  by  faith,  as  against  the  justification  of  the  catholic 
dispensation  of  grace;  and  the  authority  of  the  Scriptures,  as  against 
the  assumed  authority  of  papal  decretals. 

But  it  may  be  pertinently  asked,  what  and  whence  the  attitude 
toward  the  Roman  Church  which  resulted  in  the  statement  of  these 
principles?  Was  it  a  desire  for  a  more  strictly  moral  behavior  on 
the  part  of  clergy  and  laity?  Then  the  Reformation  would  have 
taken  the  course  of  ethical  reform  merely.  The  ethical  demands  of 
the  Reformation  were  accidental,  not  essential.  Was  it  a  desire  for 
a  closer  "walk  with  God"?  Then  the  Reformation  would  have  taken 
the  form  of  larger  patronage  of  the  monastic  life,  for  the  cloisters 
were  close  at  hand  and  numerous,  whither  they  who  so  desired  might 
withdraw  from  the  world  and  cultivate  as  profound  an  emotional 
mysticism  as  the  spirit  is  capable  of  exercising.  The  principles  of 
the  Reformation  were  the  outcome  of  an  attitude  that  had  forced 
itself  to  expression  by  reason  of  the  logical  content  of  Romanism  on 
one  hand,  and  the  consciousness  of  a  people  just  awakening  to  the 
influences  of  the  Renaissance  on  the  other. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  full-fledged  Romanism  of 
Thomas  Aquinas  had  essentially  but  one  dogma,  the  dogma  of  the 
"Church."  Subsequent  to  the  patristic  period  there  was  no  theology, 
no  christology,  no  doctrine  of  sin  or  salvation  at  any  time  in  vogue 

31 


32       THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM 

or  developed  which  did  not  fall  incidentally  under  the  larger  doctrine 
of  the  "Church."  The  Summa  Theologice,  while  treating  of  these 
subjects,  yet  comprises  them  within  a  doctrine  of  the  church,  which 
is  the  inclusive,  not  the  included.  According  to  Romanism  there 
could  be  no  theology  outside  of  the  church,  but  the  church  could 
easily  exist  with  no  clearly  developed  conception  of  God  at  all,  as  is, 
indeed,  the  case  in  catholic  theology.  That  God  exists  and  has  the 
general  extra-human  attributes  so  easily  predicated  a  priori  suffices 
for  the  inquiry  as  to  his  nature  and  relationship  to  humanity.  What 
is  of  real  importance  is  the  church  which  he  has  established  and  au- 
thorized as  the  only  possible  means  of  relationship  to  him,  and  the 
only  possible  dispenser  of  any  most  meagre  knowledge  of  God.  Now, 
the  Thomistic  dogma  of  the  church,  analyzed  into  its  fundamental 
principles,  presents  a  most  striking  logical  content.  The  three  prin- 
ciples of  catholicity,  apostolicity,  infallibility,  are  clearly  universals, 
and  could  be  only  so  regarded.  If  it  is  objected  that  apostolicity 
refers  to  a  particular  group  of  men,  it  may  be  said  that  it  does  so 
only  in  name,  not  in  content.  Apostolicity  was  the  name  for  a  divine 
authority  delegated  to  the  church;  that  and  nothing  more,  since  the 
slightest  introduction  of  any  particular  human  element  here  would 
invalidate  the  principle  of  divine  authority. 

The  principles  of  unity  and  sanctity,  while  apparently  possible 
of  application  to  a  particular,  were  yet,  as  used  by  the  church,  uni- 
versals. It  was  not  that  the  church  was  a  unit,  some  particular 
church,  but  that  of  the  church  was  a  oneness  which  was  all-inclusive, 
in  which  any  given  particular  was  of  consequence  only  as  minister- 
ing to  the  universal  church.  The  church  was  an  end,  not  a  means. 
Likewise,  the  principle  of  sanctity,  while  apparently  applicable  to 
at  least  one  particular,  the  pope,  yet  was  not  really  so,  for  the  holi- 
ness attached  to  the  office,  not  to  the  individual,  and  as  such  was  a 
pure  abstraction. 

Thus  the  one  inclusive  dogma  of  Catholicism  cannot  be  broken 
up  into  particulars.  It  is  true  that  any  Protestant  doctrine  of  the 
church  partakes  largely  of  the  same  character,  or  may  be  so  viewed; 
but  the  difference  here  between  Catholicism  and  Protestantism  con- 
sists precisely  in  the  fact  that  Protestantism  includes  a  multitude 
of  other  dogmas  which  are  largely  particular  judgments,  whereas 
Catholicism  has  no  other  dogma  than  the  dogma  "Church";  that 
is,  one  is  called  upon  to  believe  in  and  submit  himself  to  the  church 
only.  Nothing  further  is  required  in  the  Catholic  scheme.  The  his- 


THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC   FREEDOM       33 

torical  fact  that  the  precipitate  of  all  Christian  doctrine  into  this  one 
dogma,  essentially  universal  in  its  logical  content,  was  the  only  pos- 
sible form  in  which  that  religion  could  have  been  preserved  and  pre- 
sented to  modern  times,  does  not  validate  the  claim  of  the  church 
to  modern  sanction  on  the  basis  of  her  historical  service. 

Now,  while  the  doctrine  of  the  Roman  Church  was  receiving  its 
final,  closed,  universal  form  in  the  system  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  there 
was  an  equally  significant  development  taking  place  in  the  Germanic 
people, — the  development  of  the  Renaissance  and  Humanism.  And 
the  logical  essence  of  this  was  simply  the  fundamental  development 
of  critique, —  the  power  to  judge.  The  intellectual  culture  acquired 
in  the  German  schools  between  the  twelfth  and  fifteenth  centuries 
attached  to  Aristotle's  Logic  as  center.  The  study  of  Latin,  and, 
later,  of  Greek,  was  not  emphasized  until  late  in  the  period  in  ques- 
tion. It  was  left  to  the  slow  influence  of  Humanism,  with  its  re- 
markable achievements  in  Italy,  to  indicate  the  true  culture  value 
of  the  Latin  and  Greek  classics  as  literature.  It  is  of  profound  sig- 
nificance for  the  intellectual  situation  at  the  time  of  the  Reformation 
that  the  training  of  the  early  German  schools  had  been  so  impreg- 
nated with  the  desire  and  the  effort  to  cultivate  logic  as  a  school 
discipline.  For  with  the  final  statement  of  Catholicism  by  Thomas 
Aquinas  on  one  hand,  and  the  logical  culture  of  Germany  on  the 
other,  the  situation  was  not  essentially  a  moral,  or  even  a  religious 
situation,  but  rather  a  logical.  As  has  been  stated  before,  if  the 
Summa  Theologies  of  Thomas  had  been  immediately  and  widely  acces- 
sible to  the  German  people,  it  would  have  called  forth  the  Reforma- 
tion almost  immediately.  At  least  one  can  easily  see  how  it  might 
have  done  so.  For  the  logical  content  of  the  Catholic  dogma  was 
apparent  in  Thomas'  system,  and  the  pure  a  priori  assumption  upon 
which  it  rested  could  but  arouse  the  suspicion  and  criticism  of  a 
people  who  had  learned  the  elements  of  logical  thought. 

Without  affirming  the  Hegelian  principle  of  history  as  a  logical 
process,  it  may  still  be  stated  as  an  historical  fact  that  the  problem 
which  the  Reformers  undertook  to  solve  was  not  essentially  an  ethical 
problem  nor  a  religious,  though  they  were  aware  that  the  interests 
of  ethical  religion  were  profoundly  served  by  the  solution  they  gave 
to  the  problem.  Is  it  supposed  that  they  had  not  felt  themselves 
justified  by  faith,  or  had  not  drawn  hope  and  peace  from  the  Scrip- 
tures prior  to  the  discovery  of  these  principles  as  the  foundation  of 
their  reform?  It  was  not  a  yearning  for  a  goodness  or  an  inspira- 


34        THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM 

tion  not  to  be  found  in  the  Catholic  Church  which  inspired  their 
criticism  of  the  church,  for  they  could  and  did  experience  these 
before  they  broke  from  the  church.  What  they  sought  primarily 
was  a  logically  consistent  statement  of  truth.  What  the  church  urged 
upon  them  as  the  only  concept  of  value  was  a  dogma  that  could  not 
be  broken  up  into  any  particular  values.  There  was  no  place  for 
the  particular  in  the  Catholic  universal.  The  culture  of  their  times 
and  the  training  of  their  schools  had  taught  them  that  the  particular 
must  be  evalued;  that  the  universal  which  was  of  any  utility  or  value 
in  human  affairs  must  be  recognized  as  of  value  because  deduced 
from  the  mass  of  valuable  particulars;  that  no  particular,  worth  the 
statement,  could  be  deduced  from  any  universal,  assumed  a  priori; 
that  the  dogma  of  the  Catholic  Church,  revealed  in  its  complete  form 
by  Thomas  Aquinas,  was  untrue  to  the  very  elements  of  human 
thinking,  hence  impossible  of  approbation  by  a  truth-seeking  people; 
that  this  dogma,  held  up  to  the  light  of  logical  analysis,  was  nothing 
but  a  piece  of  presumptive  scholastic  fiction,  precisely  on  a  par  with 
the  assumptions  of  logic  with  which  the  mediaeval  student  amused 
himself  and  sharpened  his  wits. 

It  was  clear  to  the  logician  of  those  days  that  the  universal  must 
always  be  combined  with  the  particular  in  order  to  reach  any  prac- 
tical and  useful  judgment  whatever.  The  task  of  the  Reformers 
was  to  supply  the  particular  and  state  it  in  terms  of  the  religious 
life.  That  they  first  undertook  to  do  this  without  breaking  with 
the  church  is  proof  that  the  situation  was  presented  to  them  as 
a  logical  situation  primarily,  not  that  the  church  was  an  evil  and 
spiritless  institution  against  which  they  must  revolt.  Or,  if  the  situa- 
tion appealed  to  them  apparently  as  an  ethico-religious  problem,  yet 
the  whole  trend  of  their  action  shows  that  underneath  the  practical 
considerations  of  the  Reformation  was  the  simple  demand  that  the 
Roman  Church  should  be  logically  consistent  in  her  statement  of 
truth.  There  is,  of  course,  the  closest  connection  between  logical 
consistency  and  practical  ethics  and  religion;  one  reflects  upon  the 
other;  either  may  be  prior  in  expression  and  influence.  The  conten- 
tion is,  however,  that  if  the  practical  considerations  of  good  conduct 
and  religious  emotionalism  had  been  the  keynote  of  the  Reformation, 
it  would  have  taken  an  entirely  different  form,  with  no  necessary 
resultant  expression  of  principles  such  as  were  given  by  the  Reformers. 
What  is  the  logical  content  of  those  principles?  Not,  surely,  an 
ethical  code;  but  simply  a  particularism,  in  contradistinction  to  the 


THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC    FREEDOM       35 

universalism  of  the  Catholic  dogma.  Justification  by  faith  can  be 
taken  as  a  moral  code  only  by  robbing  it  of  the  religious  value 
which  always  attaches  to  faith.  Inspiration  of  the  Scriptures  is  no 
more  an  ethical  statement  than  would  be  the  affirmation  of  the  in- 
spiration of  a  sanctuary.  Nor  is  justification  by  faith  a  religious 
affirmation  primarily,  but  merely  a  logical  statement  of  the  manner 
in  which  a  religious  experience  takes  place.  Similarly,  inspiration  of 
the  Scriptures  is  primarily  a  statement  of  the  place  in  which  religious 
authority  resides.  The  new  thing,  on  which  the  Reformation  rested, 
was  not  a  discovery  of  "faith,"  or  of  "justification,"  or  of  "inspira- 
tion," but  the  discovery  that  the  Catholic  dogma  gave  no  logical 
existence  whatever  to  these  experiences  which  were  commonly  pos- 
sessed by  believers,  and  that  therefore  the  Catholic  dogma  was  not 
a  true  statement  of  the  content  of  the  religious  life,  though  within 
the  Catholic  Church  a  true  religious  life  could  be  cultivated  so  long 
as  it  was  content  not  to  analyze  itself  in  relation  to  the  dogma  of 
the  church. 

For  the  Reformation,  therefore,  there  were  needed  three  things: 

(a)  A  deep  religious  and  moral  life  within  the  church,  of  sufficient 
importance  to  call  for  inquiry  and  analysis  as  to  its  real  content  and 
meaning.     Such  were  the  lives  of  the  Reformers,  and  such  the  basis 
of  their  interest  while  yet  Roman  Catholics. 

(b)  A  logical  statement  of  the  real  content  of  Catholic  dogma. 
Such  was  given  for  the  first  time  by  Thomas  Aquinas. 

(c)  Sufficient  logical  acumen  on  the  part  of  the  people  to  see  the 
fallacy  of  the  Roman  dogma.     Such  was  given  to  the  Germanic 
people  by  Humanism  and  the  Renaissance. 

Given  these  three,  the  Reformation — non-Catholic  religious  free- 
dom— was  inevitable.  Lacking  any  one  of  them,  it  would  have 
been  impossible.  Inasmuch  as  the  religious  life  was  manifestly  pos- 
sible, and  did  exist,  in  the  church,  and  in  spite  of  the  church,  it  is 
evident  that  the  Reformation  was  primarily  a  logical  reformation, 
the  solution  of  a  logical  situation  in  the  interests  of  consistency. 

It  has  been  shown  (Chapters  II,  III)  how  the  analysis  of  faith 
and  reason  by  Thomas  Aquinas  gave  to  these,  positively  and  by 
implication,  the  non-Catholic  freedom  which  is  characteristic  of  Prot- 
estantism. It  has  been  shown  (Chapters  IV,  V)  that  the  Thomistic 
statement  of  the  dogma  "Church"  was  a  necessary  presupposition 
of  the  logical  moment  of  the  Reformation,  and  that  this  antedated 
the  Reformation  by  three  centuries  only  because  the  consciousness 


36       THE   GROUNDS    OF   NON-CATHOLIC   FREEDOM 

of  a  naive  people  required  that  time  for  an  intellectual  development 
sufficient  to  enable  them  to  appropriate  the  reason  and  faith  defined 
by  Thomas,  and  by  these  instruments  to  solve  the  dogmatic  problem 
which  he  set  in  clear  and  complete  logical  form.  The  logical  grounds 
of  the  dissolution  of  Catholic  dogma  are  completely  given  in  the  final, 
systematic  statement  of  that  dogma  by  the  last  and  greatest  of 
Catholic  theologians. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

1.  Opera  Editio  Alt  era  Veneta  28  torn.  Venetiis 1745-60 

2.  Opera  Omnia  iussu  impensaque  Leonis  XIII  edita.     Tom  I-XI  Romae 

1882-1903 

I.     Commentaria  in  Aristotelis 1882 

II.     Commentaria  octo  libros  Physicarum  Aristotelis      .      .      .     1884 

III.  Commentaria  in  libros  Aristotelis.     De  Caelo  et  Mundo.     De 

generatione  et  corruptione  et  meteorologicorum       .      .     1886 

IV.  Summae  Theologian 1888-1903 

3.  Commentaria  in  omnes  epistolas  beati  Pauli  Apostoli.     Basle      .      .     1495 

4.  Boethius  .  .  .  .  de  consolatione 1497 

5.  Boethius  ....  cum  triplici  commento.     Lyons  (?)    .      .      .      .     1510  (?) 

6.  Super  Epistolas  Sancti  Pauli  Commentaria.     Venice 1498 

7.  Compendium  Summse  totius  theologiae.     Romse 1765 

8.  Continuum  in  libe  Evangelii.     Mattheu  et  Marcu.     Romae     .      .      .     1470 

9.  In  libros  Aristotelis  de  Caelo  et  Mundo 1886 

10.  Expositoes  textuales  in  libros  de  Caelo  et  Mundo 1497 

11.  In  libros  Aristotelis  meteorologicorum  expositio 1886 

12.  In  libros  Peri  hermenias  expositio 1882 

13.  In  libros  posteriorum  analyticorum  expositio 1882 

14.  In  librum  primum  Aristotelis  de  generatione  et  corruptione  expositio    1886 

15.  Tosti:     Scrittivari.     Roma 1886-90 

II.     S.  Thomse  Aquinatis  propria  manuscripta  epistola  ad  Bernar- 
dum  abbatem  cassinensem 

16.  Baumann:     Die  staatslehre  des  h.  Thomas  von  Aquino    ....     1873 

17.  Summa  totius  theologise.     3  pt.,  9  vol.     Lugdumi 1663 

18.  Prima  pars — prima  secundse  summae  theologiae  cum  commentariis  cardi- 

nalis  Caietani 1888 

19.  Vio,  Tommaso  Da  (Cardinal) :    Commentaria  in  Summam  theologicam 

sancti  Thomas  Aquinatis 1893 

20.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Saint.     Die  Katholische  wahrheit,  oder  Die  theolo- 

gische  summa;  deutsch  wiedergegeben  von  C.  M.  Schneider   1886-1892 

21.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Saint.     Tractatus  de  adventu  et  statu  et  vita  anti- 

christi.     F.  Hyacinthi  de  Ferrari 1842 

22.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Saint.     Tractatus  de  prseambulis  ad  judicium  et  de 

ipso  judicio  et  ipsum  concomitanibus.     F.  Hyacinthi  Ferrari        .     1842 

23.  Antoniades,   Basilius.     Die  Staatslehre  des  Thomas  ab  Aquino.     Leip- 

zig        1890 

24.  Carle,  P.  J.     Histoire  de  la  vie  et  des  Merits  de  S.  Thomas  d'Aquin     .     1846 

25.  Franck,  Adolphe.    Reformateurs  et  publicistes  de  1'Europe,  moyen  age; 

renaissance.     Paris  .       .         1864 

37 


38  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

26.  Guttman,  J.     Das  verhaltens  des  Thomas  von  Aquino  zum  Judenthum 

und  zur  jiidischen  Literatur.     Gottingen 1891 

27.  Koppehl,  Hermann.     Die  verwandschaft  Leibnizens  mit  Thomas  von 

Aquino  in  der  Lehre  vom  bosen.     Inaugural  dissertation,  June     .     1892 

28.  Maumus,  Elisee  Vincent.     S.  Thomas  d'Aquin  et  la  philosophic  Car- 

t£sienne;  e~tudes  de  doctrines  comparees.     Paris 1890 

29.  Maurenbrecher,  Max.     Thomas  von  Aquino's  stellung  zum  wirtschafts- 

leben  seiner  Zeit.     Leipzig 1898 

30.  Molsdorf,  Wilhelm.     Die  idee  des  schonen  in  der  weltgestaltung  bei 

Thomas  von  Aquino.     Inaugural  dissertation.     Jena    .      .      .      .     1891 

31.  O'Gorman,  Thomas.     The  Life  and  Work  of  S.  Thomas  Aquinas     .     1894 

32.  Saisset,  E.     Les  grands  docteurs  du  moyen  Sge 1858 

33.  Schaub,  Franz.     Die  eigentumslehre  nach  Thomas  von  Aquino  und 

dem  modernen  Sozialismus  mit  besondern  berticksichtigung  der  bei- 
derseitigen  weltanschauungen 1898 

34.  Thomas  Aquinas.     Touran,  Antoine.     La  vie,  avec  un  expose"  de  sa 

doctrine  et  de  ses  ouvrages 1740 

35.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Saint.     Vaughan,  R.  B.     The  Life  and  Labours  of 

S.  Thomas  of  Aquinas 1871-72 

36.  Werner,  Karl:     Der  heilige  Thomas  von  Aquino  I  Leben  und  Schriften. 

II.     Die  Lehre  des  Thomas  Aquinas.     III.     Geschichte  des  Thomis- 
mus 1858 

37.  Bosone,  Cesare  Augusto:     Die  aufsatz  "De  regimine  principium"  von 

Thomas  von  Aquino;  ein  beitrag  zur  Kentniss  der  Staatsphilosophie 
'im  Mittelalter.     Inaugural  dissertation 1894 


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